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This article explores the decision in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State 
(Germany v Italy: Greece Intervening) regarding the relationship between State 
immunities and jus cogens norms. It focuses on three assertions in the case, regarding 
the criminal/civil distinction, the procedural/substantive distinction and the 
pronouncement that the gravity of the crime is irrelevant when assessing the claim for 
State immunity. The article picks apart the three assertions in turn, which leads to the 
conclusion that the analysis by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was flawed. 
Ultimately, it is argued that Germany ought not to have been afforded State immunity 
for violations of jus cogens norms. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The International Court of Justice's (hereinafter 'ICJ' or 'the Court') ruling 
in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening)1 was 
the result of a series of Italian national judgments denying immunity to 
Germany for acts committed during the Second World War.2 While 
reaching a conventional decision, there was no assessment of the relationship 
between jus cogens and State immunities. This essay will take apart the 
assertions made in the judgment, and analyse the relationship between State 
immunities and jus cogens norms, as well as the consequences flowing from 
this relationship.  
The dissenting opinion of Judge Trindade acknowledged the growing 
importance and 'primacy of jus cogens'. 3 This essay will use the ideas and 
questions raised in this dissent, and answer and clarify them using 
international law developments. While Trindade's dissent rests on the need 
for access to justice, this essay, however, will engage in a more doctrinal 
analysis.  
This essay will firstly outline the decision of the Court in Jurisdictional 
Immunities, and the main reasoning for the application of the conservative 
relationship. Subsequently, it will refute three contentions of the judges, 
namely the criminal/civil distinction, the procedural/substantive distinction, 
and the assertion that the gravity of the crime has no impact on immunities. 
It is proposed that had the judges engaged in a critical analysis of the 
relationship between jus cogens norms and State immunities, in the light of 
developments in international law, Germany ought not to have been afforded 
immunity. 
II. THE JUDGMENT IN JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES 
The facts of the case are as follows: in September 1943, Italy declared war on 
Germany, following Mussolini's removal from power. Between October 1943 
                                                 
1 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening) (Judgment) 
[2012] ICJ Rep 99. 
2 Most notably, Ferrini v Germany [2004] 128 ILR 658. 
3 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy: Greece intervening) [2012] ICJ 
Rep 99 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Trindade) para 6. 
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and the end of the Second World War, German forces engaged in massacres 
of civilians in Italian territory and in the deportation of civilians who were 
subjected to forced labour. Additionally, German forces imprisoned several 
hundred thousand members of the Italian armed forces and denied them the 
status of prisoner of war.4 They were instead deported to 'German-occupied 
territories for use as forced labour'.5 
In 1998, Ferrini, an Italian national deported to Germany in 1944, instituted 
proceedings before Italian courts against the Federal Republic of Germany 
for his detention and forced labour. The case reached the Italian Court of 
Cassation, which 'held that Italian courts had jurisdiction over the claims for 
compensation brought against Germany by […] Ferrini on the ground that 
immunity does not apply in circumstances in which the act complained of 
constitutes an international crime'.6  
Following Ferrini, similar claims were filed against Germany. Germany 
subsequently requested the ICJ's intervention, claiming that Italy had 
violated its right to State immunities by allowing civil claims to be brought in 
Italian national courts.7 Italy maintained that it had jurisdiction with regard 
to Germany's crimes under international law.  
The ICJ rejected Italy's arguments on multiple grounds. This essay will focus 
on the arguments regarding the relationship between jus cogens norms and 
State immunities. It will engage in a doctrinal analysis of three assertions of 
the judges, highlight the weaknesses of these assertions, and suggest an 
alternative interpretation of the relationship between jus cogens norms and 
State immunities. 
First, the ICJ distinguished between civil and criminal proceedings. While 
cases in national legal proceedings have found immunity to be non-
applicable, these 'concerned the immunity of a former Head of State from 
the criminal jurisdiction of another State, not the immunity of the State itself 
in proceedings designed to establish its liability to damages'.8 The ICJ also 
                                                 
4 Jurisdictional Immunities (n 1) para 21. 
5 ibid. 
6 ibid para 27. 
7 ibid para 37. 
8 ibid para 87. 
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referred to Lord Bingham's clarification of the UK's earlier case law, in Jones 
v. Saudi Arabia,9 which stated that the 'distinction between criminal and civil 
proceedings [was] "fundamental to [the] decision" [in Pinochet]' to not grant 
immunity to the former Head of State of Chile.10 Whilst Pinochet was a 
criminal proceeding, Jurisdictional Immunities was a civil proceeding, and the 
ICJ deemed this to differentiate the two and confer a stronger claim of State 
immunity on Germany.  
It is proposed that cases concerning the immunity of a former Head of State 
can inform the development of State immunity. The 'legal existence of a State 
manifests itself only in the acts of individuals': thus, the actions of a Head of 
State are also, often, the actions of a State.11 These are two 'expression[s] of a 
single principle' of sovereignty, and, for that reason, this essay will use cases 
concerning the functional immunity of a former Head of State to explore the 
legal development of the law of immunities, which includes State immunity.12  
Secondly, the ICJ noted: 
Since jus cogens rules always prevail over any inconsistent rule of international 
law […] and since the rule which accords one State immunity before the 
courts of another does not have the status of jus cogens, the rule of immunity 
must give way.13  
However, jus cogens rules do not prevail in Jurisdictional Immunities. The Court 
formulated a requirement for a 'conflict of laws' between jus cogens and State 
immunity, and concluded that the two rules never clash in such a way that one 
has to give way to another.14 In the Court's words, '[t]he rules of State 
immunity are procedural in character and are confined to determining 
                                                 
9 Jones v Saudi Arabia [2006] UKHL 26 para 32. 
10 Jurisdictional Immunities (n 1) para 87. 
11 Hans Kelsen, 'Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law with 
Particular Regard to the Punishment of War Criminals' (1943) 31 CLR 530, 540. 
12 Pasquale De Sena and Francesca De Vittor. 'State Immunity and Human Rights: The 
Italian Supreme Court Decision on the Ferrini Case' (2005) 16 EJIL 89, 110; Jerrold 
Mallory, 'Resolving the Confusion over Head of State Immunity: The Defined 
Rights of Kings' (1986) 86 CLR 169, 170; Andrea Bianchi, 'Ferrini v. Federal Republic 
of Germany' (2005) 99 AJIL 242, 247. 
13 Jurisdictional Immunities (n 1) para 92. 
14 ibid para 93. 
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whether or not the courts of one State may exercise jurisdiction in respect of 
another State'.15 Nonetheless, it is proposed that the judgment was flawed in 
assuming that there is no conflict of laws, instead 'present[ing] the decision 
as the automatic consequence of a rigid a priori substance/procedure 
distinction, rather than the outcome of weighing competing values'.16 This 
makes the reasoning behind the decision unconvincing, insofar as the judges 
failed to analyse the issues.  
Finally, the ICJ pronounced that entitlement to immunity is not dependent 
on the gravity of a situation: 
Customary international law does not treat a State's entitlement to 
immunity as dependent upon the gravity of the act of which it is accused or 
the peremptory nature of the rule which it is alleged to have violated.17 
Thus, the ICJ decided the jus cogens nature of the rule violated had no bearing 
on Germany's entitlement to immunity. However, this goes against the case 
law of other courts which did not grant immunity due to the gravity of the 
violation.18 Moreover, it disregards the nature of jus cogens itself, and is 
dissonant with the Court's claim that 'jus cogens rules always prevail over any 
inconsistent rule of international law'.19 
III. REVISITING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE IMMUNITIES 
AND JUS COGENS NORMS IN THE JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES 
JUDGMENT 
This section will evaluate the decision in Jurisdictional Immunities and 
contend that jus cogens norms ought to have superseded immunities. Three 
pronouncements by the majority in Jurisdictional Immunities will be explored. 
                                                 
15 ibid. 
16 Kimberley Trapp and Alex Mills, 'Smooth Runs the Water where the Brook is Deep: 
The Obscured Complexities of Germany v Italy' (2012) 1 CJICL 153, 163. 
17 Jurisdictional Immunities (n 1) para 84. 
18 Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v Eichmann (1962) 36 ILR 277, 308; Ferrini 
(n 2); Prefecture of Voiotia v Federal Republic of Germany (2000) 129 ILR 513 (though the 
Special Supreme Court of Greece, in Margellos v Federal Republic of Germany (2002), 
later noted that in the current state of international law, Germany had immunity and 
could not be sued). 
19 Jurisdictional Immunities (n 1) para 92. 
20 European Journal of Legal Studies  {Vol. 9 No. 2 
First, it will be argued that the distinction between criminal and civil 
proceedings is arbitrary when considering jus cogens violations.20 Secondly, 
the distinction between procedural and substantive law will be explored, and 
shown to also be arbitrary.21 Thirdly, this section will seek to refute the 
assertion that immunity is not dependent on the gravity of the violation.22 
1. The Criminal/Civil Distinction  
In Jurisdictional Immunities, the Court differentiated between criminal and 
civil proceedings. It stated that the earlier decisions concerning immunities 
for grave violations of international law, such as Pinochet, were not relevant, 
as these concerned criminal jurisdiction, not a civil claim for damages.23 It 
reasserted that the distinction between criminal and civil proceedings was 
fundamental to the Pinochet decision.24 However, it will be demonstrated that 
the distinction is arbitrary and the nature of the proceedings has no effect 
when deciding on jus cogens violations.  
Jurisdictional Immunities relied on the pronouncement in Jones v. Saudi Arabia, 
in which Lord Bingham stated that the distinction between criminal and civil 
proceedings was 'fundamental' to the decision in Pinochet.25 However, no real 
justification is provided for this assertion. On the contrary: 
While the distinctions between civil and criminal proceedings should 
certainly not be ignored, they should not necessarily erase the fundamental 
message of Pinochet: some acts are not part of the official behavior that 
immunity is intended to protect.26  
It will, first, be argued that criminal and civil proceedings are not antithetical, 
but complementary concepts. Secondly, the ICJ ignored previous State 
practice, in which States accepted civil proceedings for jus cogens violations. 
Finally, it is proposed that the distinction is arbitrary. Thus, in contrast to the 
                                                 
20 Jurisdictional Immunities (n 1) para 87. 
21 ibid para 93. 
22 ibid para 84. 
23 ibid para 87. 
24 ibid. 
25 ibid; Jones (n 9) para 32. 
26 Stacy Humes-Schulz, 'Limiting Sovereign Immunity in the Age of Human Rights' 
(2008) 21 Harv.Hum.Rts.J. 105‚ 118. 
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assertion of the judges in Jurisdictional Immunities, the criminal/civil 
distinction does not affect the relationship between immunities and jus cogens 
norms.  
A. Complementarity 
Humes-Schulz, in her discussion of criminal and civil liability, notes that the 
'two forms of liability work together and reinforce each other frequently'.27 
Thus, criminal and civil proceedings are not irreconcilable. Criminal and civil 
liability are complementary to each other: while criminal liability provides a 
mechanism by which to punish wrongdoers, civil liability shifts the focus to 
the victim and provides reparations in order to counterbalance the wrongful 
act.28 Thus, Humes-Schulz views criminal sanctions as the result of a violation 
of an obligation to the State, and civil sanctions as the result of a violation of 
an obligation to the victim.  
Building on this framework, criminal and civil proceedings can be seen as two 
parts of a whole. When a crime has been committed, both the community 
and the individual are harmed. Thus, while criminal liability redresses the 
harm to the community, civil liability redresses the harm to the individual. In 
this way, the wrongdoing has, as far as possible, been wholly redressed. 
Therefore, it is proposed that criminal and civil proceedings are not 
disparate, but complementary to each other. Thus, it is difficult to see, firstly, 
why the decision in Pinochet allegedly depended on this distinction and, 
secondly, why the nature of the proceedings should affect the relationship 
between jus cogens norms and immunities.  
B. State Practice 
Moreover, the ICJ in Jurisdictional Immunities failed to note that civil 
jurisdiction had been exercised for serious international crimes. For example, 
the United States has, for many years, exercised universal jurisdiction in civil 
proceedings for serious violations of international law, and this has not been 
challenged by other States.29 Further, the Committee against Torture has 
                                                 
27 ibid. 
28 ibid. 
29 ibid; Lori Fisler Damrosch, 'Enforcing International Law through Non-Forcible 
Measures' (1997) 269 Collected Courses of The Hague Academy of International Law 
22 European Journal of Legal Studies  {Vol. 9 No. 2 
concluded that there is a need for civil redress, even when there is the obstacle 
of State immunity.30 Finally, there is case law, especially from Canada, USA, 
Italy and Greece, to show State practice for courts allowing civil proceedings 
against a State.31  
The ICJ relied on UK case law, which has mainly concerned criminal 
proceedings, yet disregarded civil proceedings concerning violations of 
peremptory norms in other jurisdictions. Thus, the contention in 
Jurisdictional Immunities that an assessment of immunities in relation to jus 
cogens violations can only occur in criminal proceedings is not unequivocally 
shared by current State practice.  
C. Arbitrary Distinction 
Looking at the nature of jus cogens norms, the minority in Al-Adsani observed 
that: 
The distinction […] between civil and criminal proceedings […] is not 
consonant with the very essence of […] jus cogens rules. It is not the nature of 
the proceedings which determines the effects that a jus cogens rule has upon 
another rule of international law, but the character of the rule as a 
peremptory norm and its interaction with a hierarchically lower rule.32  
Jus cogens norms are, by their very nature, hierarchically higher than other 
rules of international law and thus supersede the latter. The minority noted 
that immunities are a hierarchically lower rule, as they can be waived, 
contracted out of, or renounced.33 Therefore, the distinction between 
                                                 
9, 161-167; Elina Steinerte and Rebecca Wallace, 'Case Report: Jones v. Ministry of the 
Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia' (2006) 100 AJIL 901, 905; John Murphy, 'Civil 
Liability for the Commission of International Crimes as an Alternative to Criminal 
Prosecution' (1999) 12 Harv. Hum. Rts. J 1, 32. 
30 Committee against Torture 'Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee 
Against Torture: Canada' (7 May–1 June 2012) UN Doc. CAT/C/CAN/CO/6, Art 15.  
31 Damrosch (n 29) 168; Steinerte (n 29) 905-906; Sevrine Knuchel, 'State Immunity and 
the Promise of Jus Cogens' (2011) 9 Northwestern Journal of International Human 
Rights 149, 155; Siderman de Blake v. Argentina (1992) 965 F. 2d 699; Ferrini (n 2); 
Prefecture of Voiotia (n 18). 
32 Al-Adsani v United Kingdom App No 35763/97 (ECHR, 21 November 2001) (Joint 
Dissenting Opinion) 31. 
33 ibid 30. 
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criminal and civil proceedings is arbitrary in this context as peremptory 
norms would supersede immunities regardless of whether the proceedings 
were of a criminal or civil nature.  
Although the nature of criminal and civil proceedings is indeed different, this 
fact does not affect the legal responsibility or the relationship between jus 
cogens and immunities. The decision in Jurisdictional Immunities treated this 
distinction as completely altering the claim for immunities. However, as 
Judge Loucaides stated in his dissenting opinion in Al-Adsani:  
The rationale behind the principle of international law that those 
responsible for atrocious acts of torture must be accountable is not based 
solely on the objectives of criminal law. It is equally valid in relation to any 
legal liability whatsoever.34 
Judge Loucaides' dissenting opinion in Al-Adsani convincingly argued that 
the distinction between criminal and civil proceedings, in a case concerning 
the determination of immunity for jus cogens violations, is arbitrary. The 
dissent noted that once a violation of a jus cogens rule is established, no 
'immunity can be invoked in respect of any judicial proceedings whose object 
is the attribution of legal responsibility'.35 Thus, it is irrelevant whether this 
responsibility is decided in a criminal or civil context. This is a factor 
regarding the nature of legal proceedings which the majorities in Al-Adsani 
and Jurisdictional Immunities did not consider. Therefore, it does not matter 
whether the proceeding is of a civil or criminal nature. The rules relating to 
jus cogens apply regardless of the nature of the claim, and, for this reason, the 
distinction made by the judges in Jurisdictional Immunities is arbitrary.  
As a final note, Cassese argued that civil jurisdiction is less intrusive than 
criminal jurisdiction.36 For example, when it is exercised over a State official, 
there is no possibility of imprisonment and consequent disruption to the 
State. Thus, it is questionable why Jurisdictional Immunities expressly forbade 
                                                 
34 Al-Adsani v United Kingdom App No 35763/97 (ECHR, 21 November 2001) 
(Dissenting Opinion of Judge Loucaides) 34. 
35 ibid. 
36 Antonio Cassese, 'When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International 
Crimes? Some Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case' (2002) 13 EJIL 853, 859.  
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civil jurisdiction whilst not disputing the criminal jurisdiction exercised in 
Pinochet.  
Summarily, there does not seem to be a need or a justification for the 
distinction in Jurisdictional Immunities between criminal and civil 
proceedings. Nor did the majority in this case provide a convincing reason as 
to why immunities can cease for jus cogens violations only in criminal 
proceedings. This decision disregarded the nature of jus cogens and also 
hyperbolised the distinction between criminal and civil proceedings. This 
section has shown, through an assessment of the aims of civil and criminal 
proceedings, State practice, and the nature of jus cogens norms, that the 
decision in Jurisdictional Immunities is unconvincing in its differentiation of 
civil and criminal proceedings, and that the above differentiation should have 
no effect on the relationship between jus cogens norms and State immunities. 
2. The Procedural/Substantive Law Distinction 
In Jurisdictional Immunities, the ICJ stated that although the rule of immunity 
must give way to the hierarchically higher rule of jus cogens, this may only 
happen if there is a conflict of laws.37 However, the judges deemed the 'rules 
of State immunity [to be] procedural in character and […] confined to 
determining whether or not the courts of one State may exercise jurisdiction 
in respect of another State'.38 Jus cogens rules, on the other hand, are 
substantive in nature.39 Thus, it was argued that the rule of immunity and the 
rule of jus cogens never clashed, as they are different in character and the 'two 
sets of rules address different matters'.40  
This section will firstly argue that the distinction between procedural and 
substantive law is arbitrary when addressing jus cogens violations. In the 
alternative, it will contend that, even if accepting the distinction between 
procedural and substantive law, the judgment was flawed in assuming that jus 
cogens could only be substantive law, and immunities a matter of procedural 
law. It will be argued that there is indeed a conflict of laws. This, in turn, leads 
                                                 
37 Jurisdictional Immunities (n 1) paras 92-93. 
38 ibid para 93. 
39 ibid para 95. 
40 ibid para 93. 
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to jus cogens norms superseding the law of State immunity when such conflict 
occurs.  
A. Arbitrary Distinction 
First, the nature of jus cogens rules means that they supersede any other legal 
norm.41 Thus, it is irrelevant whether that norm is a procedural or substantive 
rule. When any other legal rule comes into contact with a jus cogens rule, it 
must give way. This was the view of the minority in Al-Adsani, who stated that 
'the procedural bar of State immunity is automatically lifted, […] as they 
conflict with a hierarchically higher rule, [so] do not produce any legal 
effect'.42 
Furthermore, Judge Trindade, in his dissenting opinion in Jurisdictional 
Immunities, criticised the majority for failing to provide reasoning for the 
alleged distinction between procedural and substantive law.43 This 
'formalistic' lack of conflict between State immunities and jus cogens norms 
seems to be an arbitrary, constructed distinction in order to avoid the 
contentious question of whether jus cogens norms can now deprive sovereign 
States of immunity.44  
Charles Chamberlayne, in his book A Treatise on the Modern Law of Evidence, 
argued that the 'distinction between procedural and substantive law is 
artificial'.45 For example, in Pinochet, substance and procedure were linked, as 
'the substantive prohibition on torture entailed procedural consequences, 
                                                 
41 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 
27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331, Art 64. 
42 Al-Adsani, Joint Dissenting Opinion (n 32) 30. 
43 Trindade (n 3) para 298. 
44 ibid para 315; This has been described as a 'conflict avoidance technique' Philippa 
Webb, 'Human Rights and the Immunities of State Officials' in Erika de Wet and 
Jure Vidmar (eds), Hierarchy in International Law: The Place of Human Rights (OUP 
2012) 147. 
45 Charles Chamberlayne, A Treatise on the Modern Law of Evidence (Sweet & Maxwell 
Limited 1911) 217; Friedrich Karl von Savigny, Private International Law. A Treatise on 
the Conflict of Laws: And the Limits of Their Operation in Respect of Place and Time (T.&T. 
Clark 1869) 102; Walter Wheeler Cook, '"Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict 
of Laws' (1933) 42 YLJ 333, 355. 
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including an exception to State immunity'.46 A further example is the 
exhaustion of local remedies, which has been interpreted as both a procedural 
and substantive rule.47 This shows that there is overlap between substance 
and procedure, rather than a stark distinction. However, this was not 
acknowledged by the majority in Jurisdictional Immunities. 
B. Conflict of Laws 
In any case, even if there is a distinction between procedural and substantive 
law, the Court's judgment in Jurisdictional Immunities is premised on the 
assumption that conflict cannot exist between the rules of State immunity 
and jus cogens. First, the assertion that the procedural rule of immunities and 
the substantive law of jus cogens never clash is dismantled by the decision in 
Pinochet, in which there was a clash, as jus cogens superseded the claim for 
immunities. Secondly, the ruling in Jurisdictional Immunities failed to consider 
that jus cogens rules are not merely substantive, but can also have procedural 
elements; and immunities are not merely procedural rules, but can be 
construed as substantive.  
A procedural rule will first be defined. Through this definition, it will be 
argued that immunities are not necessarily rules of procedure, but can also be 
of substantive nature. Secondly, it will be argued that jus cogens norms are not 
merely substantive rules, but can have procedural elements. Finally, the right 
to access of justice, an overarching theme in Judge Trindade's dissent, will be 
examined. 
a. What Is a Procedural Rule? 
Procedural rules have tended to relate to the jurisdiction of a court, and the 
admissibility of the case.48 Issues of admissibility and jurisdiction are dealt 
with at the beginning of a case, before the substantive merits stage.49 
Whereas jurisdiction concerns whether the Court has the legal power to 
                                                 
46 Trapp (n 16) 161. 
47 James Fawcett, 'The Exhaustion of Local Remedies: Substance or Procedure?' (1954) 
31 BYBIL 452, 453. 
48 Hugh Thirlway, 'The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1960-
1989' (2011) 82 BYBIL 1, 73. 
49 John Graham Merrills, International Dispute Settlement (CUP 2011) 119. 
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adjudicate, Yuval Shany defined admissibility as concerning whether the 
court should exercise its legal power to adjudicate.50 
In Jurisdictional Immunities, it was held that the 'rules of State immunity are 
procedural in character and […] confined to determining whether […] the 
courts of one State may exercise jurisdiction in respect of another'.51 
However, it is contended that, in relation to jus cogens violations, the courts 
of one State may exercise jurisdiction over another State. Due to the erga 
omnes nature of jus cogens norms, all States have universal jurisdiction52 when 
they are breached.53 For the purposes of this argument, jurisdiction will be 
limited to adjudicative jurisdiction, which is the power to subject a person or 
a State to judicial process.54  
As States have universal jurisdiction to adjudicate on jus cogens violations, the 
requirement of possessing the legal power to adjudicate is fulfilled. Further, 
under the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), States have an obligation to recognise as 
unlawful a breach of a peremptory norm.55 The wording of Article 41 
ARSIWA is reiterated by the ICJ in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a 
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.56 This implies a positive obligation 
                                                 
50 Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts (OUP 2014) 84; S.Gozie 
Ogbodo, 'An Overview of the Challenges Facing the International Court of Justice 
in the 21st Century' (2012) 18 Ann.Surv.Int'l & Comp.L. 93, 97. 
51 Jurisdictional Immunities (n 1) 93. 
52 As of September 2012, 147 out of 193 States have implemented national legislation 
providing universal jurisdiction for war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide or 
torture (Amnesty International, Universal Jurisdiction: A Preliminary Survey of 
Legislation Around the World – 2012 Update (Amnesty International Publications 2012) 
2). This portrays the extent to which universal jurisdiction, for these crimes, is 
accepted by the international community. 
53 Mary Robinson, The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction (Princeton 
University 2001); Tanaz Moghadam, 'Revitalizing Universal Jurisdiction: Lessons 
from Hybrid Tribunals Applied to the Case of Hissene Habre' (2008) 39 
Colum.Hum.Rts.L.Rev. 471, 477. 
54 Anthony Colangelo, 'Jurisdiction, Immunity, Legality, and Jus Cogens' (2013) 14 CJIL 
53, 55. 
55 UNGA Res 56/83 (28 January 2002) UN Doc A/RES/56/83 (ARSIWA), Art 41(2). 
56 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
(Advisory Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep 136 paras 159-160. 
28 European Journal of Legal Studies  {Vol. 9 No. 2 
to recognise as unlawful a breach of a peremptory norm, thus suggesting that 
courts ought to exercise their legal power to deem it unlawful: hence, the 
admissibility criterion, under Shany's definition, is also fulfilled.57 Therefore, 
the procedural requirements are satisfied. This shows that immunities are 
not a procedural bar to adjudication.  
Instead, Anthony Colangelo, in his work 'Jurisdiction, Immunity, Legality, 
and Jus Cogens', argued that 'immunity is a substantive defense from liability, 
not a jurisdictional defense about the appropriate forum'.58 Immunities 
operate to afford protection regardless of the substantive merits of the case 
– if a jus cogens violation is found, immunities serve to provide a substantive 
defense from liability.  
For example, in Arrest Warrant, the ICJ stated that 'immunity from 
jurisdiction [...] does not mean [...] impunity in respect of any crimes [...] 
committed'.59 If immunity was a procedural defence, the case would not 
proceed, and there would be no determination of legal responsibility, which 
in turn would lead to impunity. However, if immunity were a substantive 
defense from liability, the merits could first be examined. In order to ensure 
that immunity does not mean impunity, immunity must necessarily be a 
substantive defence from liability. Though the ICJ was not referring to an 
exercise of jurisdiction over another State, but cited other methods through 
which an individual could be prosecuted, such as by the court of their 
nationality or through a waiver of immunity. Judge Van den Wyngaert, in her 
dissent, noted that, in practice, 'immunity leads to de facto impunity'.60 Thus, 
it is necessary that foreign courts exercise their universal jurisdiction, and 
possible to do so as immunity is necessarily a substantive, rather than 
procedural, defence.  
                                                 
57 Shany (n 50) 84. 
58 Colangelo (n 54) 57. 
59 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v Belgium) (Judgment) 
[2002] ICJ Rep 3 para 60. 
60 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) ICJ Rep 3 
(Dissenting Opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert) para 34. 
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Hence, it is questionable whether immunities are procedural in nature. If 
they are, indeed, a substantive defence, then there would be a 'conflict of laws' 
with the substantive rule of jus cogens. 
b. Are Jus Cogens Norms Purely Substantive? 
In Jurisdictional Immunities, jus cogens norms were deemed to be substantive 
rules which 'determine[d] whether [certain] conduct is lawful or unlawful'.61 
However, it will be argued that jus cogens norms are not solely substantive 
rules. Firstly, their purpose is to 'impact on the legal consequences of [a 
peremptory] breach'.62 Therefore, it does not make sense to define them as 
purely substantive, as they impact any legal breach. Secondly, it will be argued 
that jus cogens norms are not purely substantive as they have procedural 
elements.  
Bartsch and Elberling propose a convincing argument that 'every jus cogens 
rule contains or presupposes a procedural rule which guarantees its judicial 
enforcement'.63 They argue that because all jus cogens norms are erga omnes, 
they must presuppose a superior means of enforcement.64 It could also be 
argued, building on this argument, that the application of jus cogens 
necessitates a procedural rule of judicial enforcement. If there were no means 
of enforcement, peremptory norms, whilst being a higher source of 
international law, would also be impotent.  
However, jus cogens norms are enforced. In Jurisdictional Immunities, it was 
noted that 'jus cogens rules always prevail over any inconsistent rule of 
international law'.65 Hence, the hierarchical superiority of jus cogens norms 
would, theoretically, ensure enforceability over other rules of international 
law. Thus, it seems logical to conclude that 'every jus cogens rule ipso facto 
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contains a procedural element' of enforcement.66 This means that there is a 
conflict of laws between the procedural enforcement of jus cogens and the 
procedural rule of immunities. When such conflict occurs, the rule relating 
to jus cogens would supersede the rule of immunities. 
The procedural/substantive distinction is advocated by Stefan Talmon in his 
exploration of jus cogens after Jurisdictional Immunities. Talmon defined 
procedural rules as: 'rules governing the judicial and non-judicial 
interpretation, implementation, and enforcement of substantive rules'.67 
This definition of a 'procedural rule', which Talmon used to justify the 
decision of the Court, instead serves to reinforce the argument that jus cogens 
rules have a procedural, as well as substantive, element. The substantive rule 
of jus cogens requires interpretation, implementation, and enforcement. Thus, 
at these three stages, jus cogens is a procedural rule. Therefore, at the 
interpretation, implementation, and enforcement stage of a jus cogens rule, 
there is a conflict of laws.  
Alternatively, the determination of a rule as jus cogens is procedural, as courts 
must determine the rule violated and whether the violation provides 
jurisdiction. In Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite, the 
ICJ stated that 'the performance by the State of its obligation to establish the 
universal jurisdiction of its courts over the crime of torture, [a jus cogens 
norm,] is a necessary condition' to enable proceedings to be brought.68 In 
order for universal jurisdiction to be established, a serious crime under 
international law, such as a jus cogens violation, must be committed.69 
Therefore, the procedural process of assessing jurisdiction necessitates the 
inspection of the violated rule. 
It has been shown that the distinction between procedural and substantive 
rules does not apply when jus cogens norms are involved, firstly due to the 
nature of jus cogens, and secondly because jus cogens norms are not purely 
substantive rules; they have procedural elements which the Court failed to 
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consider. It is this lack of analysis into the nature of jus cogens which makes 
the decision regarding the procedural/substantive distinction unconvincing.  
C. Access to Justice 
The argument concerning access to justice, in relation to the 
procedural/substantive divide, will briefly be explored. Judge Trindade's 
overarching concern in his dissent is the need for access to justice. He 
criticised the 'deconstruction' of jus cogens as a substantive rule, to the 
detriment of the victims.70 It will now be examined whether access to justice 
does have any impact on the procedural/substantive distinction.  
Judge Cassese deemed the right of access to justice to be a jus cogens norm.71 
The right of access to justice concerns whether a Court should exercise its 
legal power to grant victims the possibility of legal redress, and thus is a 
matter of admissibility. Therefore, it is procedural in nature. 
Using Cassese's reasoning, if access to justice were jus cogens, this would mean 
that there would be a conflict of laws with the procedural jus cogens rule and 
the allegedly procedural determination of State immunity. However, it is 
doubtful whether the right of access to justice is a jus cogens rule. Though 
Cassese referred to judicial decisions, it was conceded that 'there are few 
judicial pronouncements' elevating the right of access to justice to the rank 
of jus cogens.72 In fact, these pronouncements are mainly found in separate 
opinions, as opposed to judgments, of the Inter-American Court of Human 
                                                 
70 Trindade (n 3) paras 296-297. 
71 In the Matter of El Sayed (Order Assigning Matter to Pre-Trial Judge) STL 
CH/PRES/2010/01 (15 April 2010) para 29. 
72 ibid; Goiburu v Paraguay (Judgment) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series 
C No 153 (22 September 2006) para 131; Pueblo Bello Massacre v Colombia (Separate 
Opinion of Judge Trindade) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 140 
(31 January 2006) para 63-65; Baldeon-Garcia v Peru (Separate Opinion of Judge 
Trindade) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series Series C No 147 (6 April 
2006) paras 9-10; Dismissed Congressional Employees v Peru (Separate Opinion of Judge 
Trindade) Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C No 158 (24 November 
2006) paras 4-7. 
32 European Journal of Legal Studies  {Vol. 9 No. 2 
Rights.73 On the other hand, the prohibition of torture, genocide, and war 
crimes is, firstly, found in judgments of both national and international courts 
and, secondly, codified in widely ratified treaties.74 The right to access to 
justice is not. Therefore, there is insufficient support for the claim that the 
right of access to justice is a jus cogens norm. Thus, it has little impact on the 
procedure/substance distinction.  
IV. THE GRAVITY OF VIOLATIONS 
In Jurisdictional Immunities, the ICJ deemed there to be 'serious violations of 
the law of armed conflict' which amounted to jus cogens violations.75 
Nonetheless, the Court ruled that a State's entitlement to immunity does not 
depend on the gravity or peremptory nature of the crime committed.76 This 
will be examined in the light of the growing prevalence of international 
human rights law and international criminal law, and the nature of jus cogens 
norms in themselves. 
Jus cogens norms must be looked at in the wider context of international law.77 
International criminal law, in particular, has allowed for individuals, 
including high ranking officials, to be punished for the 'most serious crimes' 
in international law.  
It would be paradoxical to allow the individuals who are […] the most 
responsible for the crimes […] to invoke the sovereignty of the State and to 
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hide behind the immunity that is conferred on them by virtue of their 
positions.78  
This portrays a doctrinal and moral shift away from absolute immunity, with 
more of a focus being placed on the gravity of the crime committed and 
accountability for these crimes.79 This is a relatively new approach in 
international law, brought about by international human rights and 
international criminal law developments. It is submitted, from a rereading of 
functionalism, that this approach takes into consideration the necessary 
functions required to perform a State's obligations, and recognises that jus 
cogens violations are not a necessary function.  
Judge Trindade placed jus cogens norms in the 'framework' of human rights 
and international criminal law developments.80 This is important, because it 
is something the majority failed to do. Yet, it is only by placing jus cogens 
norms in their legal context that the extent of their application can be 
deduced. There has been a doctrinal shift in international law, and Heads of 
State and officials have increasingly been denied immunities for international 
crimes.81 From this, it is evident that Jurisdictional Immunities ought to have 
responded to these legal developments. 
Furthermore, the nature of peremptory norms must be considered. The 
gravity of the crime must be looked at in order to determine whether there 
has indeed been a jus cogens violation. Torture, genocide and war crimes have 
all been deemed jus cogens violations by international courts: these crimes are, 
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by their nature, grave and serious violations which 'shock the conscience of 
mankind'.82 It is thus argued that the majority's claim in Jurisdictional 
Immunities, namely that immunity is not dependent on the gravity or 
peremptory nature of the crime committed, is specious.83  
In Jurisdictional Immunities, the ICJ simultaneously decided that there was a 
jus cogens violation and that the gravity of the violation did not matter. These 
two assertions do not concur. A jus cogens violation is, by its very nature, a 
grave violation of international law. Its status as a jus cogens violation means 
that it is hierarchically higher than the rule of immunity and thus the 
'jurisdictional bar is lifted by the very interaction of the international rules 
involved'.84 Therefore, the nature of jus cogens means that the gravity of the 
violation is indeed relevant in determining a State's entitlement to immunity. 
The judgment in Jurisdictional Immunities did not address this, and thus did 
not explore the nature of jus cogens norms. Had the majority done so, it is 
proposed that the Court ought to have held that immunities were lifted as a 
result of a jus cogens violation.  
Finally, it is important to note that State immunities are an exception to the 
rule of adjudicatory jurisdiction. Thus, they are not a rule but an exception to 
a rule. As Rosalyn Higgins noted in her work 'Certain Unresolved Aspects of 
the Law of State Immunity', 'it is very easy to elevate sovereign immunity into 
a superior principle of international law and to lose sight of the essential 
reality that it is an exception to the normal doctrine of jurisdiction'.85 In 
Jurisdictional Immunities, State immunities ultimately trump jus cogens norms. 
They have somehow been elevated into a status above non-derogable norms, 
but this does not concur with their actual status in international law. It is, 
instead, claimed that the relationship between jus cogens norms and State 
immunities ought to have been interpreted in such a way so that Germany 
would not have been afforded immunity for war crimes.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
This essay has explored the decision in Jurisdictional Immunities, regarding the 
relationship between State immunities and jus cogens norms, in light of 
developments in international law. The judgment itself has been placed in 
context, as the result of a series of Italian judgments prosecuting Germany 
for crimes committed during World War II. It is these crimes that the ICJ 
regarded as jus cogens violations.  
The Court relied on three assertions in granting State immunity for the jus 
cogens violation: (i) the distinction between criminal and civil proceedings is 
fundamental; (ii) the distinction between procedural and substantive law 
meant that there was no conflict of laws so immunities still applied; and (iii) 
the gravity of the violation is irrelevant to the assessment of immunities. 
These assertions have been looked at in turn, and shown to involve a lack of 
analysis as well as a prevalence of arbitrary distinctions. While Trindade's 
dissent focused on the need for access to justice and the importance of human 
rights, this essay has explored the Court's decision through a doctrinal 
analysis.  
It is submitted that Jurisdictional Immunities required greater analysis of the 
nature of jus cogens in relation to State immunities. Had the majority properly 
analysed the nature of jus cogens norms and State immunities, no immunities 
for jus cogens violations ought to have been afforded.
